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Abstract The IEEE 802.11 protocol inherently provides the same long-term through-
put to all the clients associated with a given access point (AP). In this paper, we first
identify a clever, low-power jamming attack that can take advantage of this behavioral
trait: the placement of a low-power jammer in a way that it affects a single legitimate
client can cause starvation to all the other clients. In other words, the total throughput
provided by the corresponding AP is drastically degraded. To fight against this attack,
we design FIJI, a cross-layer anti-jamming system that detects such intelligent jammers
and mitigates their impact on network performance. FIJI looks for anomalies in the AP
load distribution to efficiently perform jammer detection. It then makes decisions with
regards to optimally shaping the traffic such that: (a) the clients that are not explicitly
jammed are shielded from experiencing starvation and, (b) the jammed clients receive
the maximum possible throughput under the given conditions. We implement FIJI in
real hardware; we evaluate its efficacy through experiments on two wireless testbeds,
under different traffic scenarios, network densities and jammer locations. We perform
experiments both indoors and outdoors, and we consider both WLAN and mesh de-
ployments. Our measurements suggest that FIJI detects such jammers in real-time and
alleviates their impact by allocating the available bandwidth in a fair and efficient way.
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1 Introduction
The proliferation of IEEE 802.11-based networks makes them an attractive target for
malicious attackers with jamming devices [1,2]. A jammer typically emits electromag-
netic energy thereby causing: (a) prolonged packet collisions at collocated devices, and
(b) packet transmission deferrals due to legitimate nodes detecting continuous medium
activity. Hence, jamming attacks can lead to significant throughput degradation, espe-
cially when they intelligently exploit the properties of the MAC protocol in use.
In this paper, we first identify a clever jamming attack where the jammer can not
only hurt its intended victim, but cause starvation to other clients that are associated
with the same AP as the victim. We call this attack the Implicit-Jamming attack.
We design and implement FIJI, a cross-layer anti-jamming system to effectively detect
such jammers and mitigate the impact of their attack.
The implicit-jamming attack: An inherent characteristic of the IEEE 802.11
MAC protocol is that under saturated traffic demands, an AP (access point) will pro-
vide the same long-term throughput to all of its affiliated clients [3]. If a client cannot
receive high throughput from its AP for any reason (e.g. long-distance AP→client link
or high levels of interference at the client side), the AP will spend a large amount of
time serving this client at a low transmission bit-rate; this rate is determined by the
rate adaptation algorithm in use. This will compel the AP to serve each of its other
“healthier” clients (to which it can support higher transmission rates) for smaller peri-
ods. In other words, the AP does not distinguish between clients with low-SINR links
and clients with high-SINR links; the long times taken to serve the former class of
clients hurts the time available to serve the latter class of clients. This behavior is re-
ferred to as the performance anomaly of 802.11 [4] and is caused by the inherent design
principles of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol (described in more detail in section 2).
The implicit jammer exploits this anomaly. To illustrate, consider the WLAN sce-
nario depicted in Fig. 2 (left). In this scenario: (a) all 5 clients have high-SINR links
with their AP in benign conditions, and (b) a low power jammer is placed next to a
particular client (client C) such that it does not directly affect any other client of the
AP. The jammer causes high levels of interference at client C and thus, most of the
packets sent by the AP to C are not successfully received. This in turn causes the AP
to reduce the transmission rate used to serve C (an inherent property of rate adapta-
tion). As a result, the AP spends more time attempting to serve C, and this reduces
the fraction of time that it provides to its other clients. Thus, the throughput of all the
clients drops significantly due to the jamming of only client C. In other words, jamming
a small subset of clients (even only a single client) implicitly affects all the clients that
are affiliated with the same AP. Furthermore, depending on the traffic pattern and the
topology, the implicit jamming attack may affect a much wider part of the network
than a limited WLAN setting. As an example, consider the mesh deployment in Fig. 2
(right), where all devices are set to the same channel. Let us assume that clients S1-S4
transmit fully saturated UDP traffic to clients D1-D4 respectively, via a mesh back-
haul network consisting of a set of wireless routers [5]. Similarly as above, a low-power
jammer is placed next to client D3 such that only the latter is explicitly affected. Due
to the fair nature of 802.11, AP3 needs to spend a lot more time serving client D3 and
3Fig. 1 Implicit Jamming: The jammer takes advantage of the 802.11 performance anomaly.
Using very low transmission power, it simply attacks one client. The attack can affect a WLAN
topology (left) as well as an extended mesh deployment (right).
hence, the fraction of time allocated for transmissions to clients D1-D3 as well as to
AP3 is reduced. As a consequence, the implicit jamming attack incurs additional delays
at AP2 in forwarding the packets from S4 towards D4. In other words, the jamming
of a single client may affect the throughput of clients that are affiliated with different
APs in other parts of the network.
The impact of the implicit-jamming attack: In order to demonstrate the
potential impact of this attack on the performance of the network, we conduct a set
of preliminary experiments on our wireless testbed (described later in section 4). In
particular, we construct the WLAN scenario in Fig. 2 (left), where an AP maintains
ongoing sessions with 5 clients and transmits saturated unicast traffic to all of these
clients. We place a jammer 7 ft. away from one client (C). The jammer emits energy
continuously at 0 dBm (1 mW), such that it causes interference to client C only. Fig.
2 depicts our throughput measurements, with and without the jammer. We observe
that in the absence of jamming each client receives 4.1 Mbits/sec, on average. When
the jammer is enabled, however, the long-term throughput of all clients drops to 90
Kbits/sec. We explain this behavior analytically in section 2.1.
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Fig. 2 The implicit jamming attack can tremendously degrade the total network throughput.
FIJI: An anti-jamming system to mitigate the implicit-jamming attack:
In order to alleviate the effects of this intelligent attack, we design and implement FIJI,
a distributed software system that is executed locally at the APs. With FIJI, the AP
is able to quickly detect an implicit jamming attack and identify the clients that are
under the direct influence of the jammer(s). Furthermore, via a minimal set of online
4calibrating measurements that characterize the impact of the attack, the AP shapes
the downlink traffic such that: (a) the jammed clients receive the maximum possible
throughput given the circumstances, and (b) the rest of the clients are unaffected, i.e.,
shielded from the influence of the jammer(s). Some parts of FIJI are implemented on
the Click software framework [6] and the rest are implemented on the driver/firmware
of our wireless cards. We apply FIJI on two different 802.11a/g wireless testbeds [7].
Via extensive experiments, we observe that FIJI effectively mitigates the implicit-
jamming attack by restoring the throughput to the non-jammed clients while providing
the maximum possible throughput to the jammed ones.
Our work in perspective: FIJI can be potentially applied in scenarios wherein jam-
mers attack APs directly. However, in this work, we focus on addressing intelligent
jammers that exploit the performance anomaly at the client side. Moreover, note that
the impact of implicit jamming is exacerbated in downlink traffic scenarios; with uplink
traffic, jammed clients will simply defer accessing the medium and will thereby allow
the other clients to obtain higher levels of access.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief
background on the performance anomaly in 802.11 as well as jamming attacks, and
discuss related studies. In section 3, we describe the implicit jamming detection and
mitigation with FIJI, our anti-jamming system. We describe the implementation of
FIJI and evaluate its effectiveness in section 4. In section 5, we elaborate on certain
attributes of FIJI and discuss the applicability of our framework in different settings.
We conclude in section 6.
2 Background and Previous Work
In this section, we first describe the so-called performance anomaly with IEEE 802.11
and efforts related to addressing the anomaly. We then discuss jamming attacks in brief
as well as prior work related to anti-jamming.
2.1 Performance Anomaly in 802.11 wireless access networks
Heusse et al. [4] were the first to observe that the long term throughput of all the
clients associated with an AP in a WLAN is limited by the client with the poorest link.
This effect eventually provides the same long-term throughput to all clients. Although
[4] considers uplink traffic, this “anomaly” arises with downlink traffic as well [8,9].
With either uplink or downlink saturated traffic, 802.11 provides equal medium access
probability to all links. Let us consider the downlink scenario. An AP→client link
with low SINR will coerce the rate adaptation mechanism at the AP to use a low
transmission rate for this client. Thus, when attempting to serve this client, the AP
will spend large amounts of time. Given that the AP will access the channel with
equal probability for low-SINR clients and high-SINR clients (higher bit rate, shorter
transmission durations), the latter will be served for smaller proportions of time.
Let us assume that AP α is sending saturated unicast traffic to each of its κ
clients. The theoretical instantaneous transmission rate from AP α towards client ci,
where i ∈ {1, ..., κ}, is a step function of the SINR for this client [10]. In this work, we
consider fci to be the instantaneous deliverable rate towards client ci, which in practice
may not always be equal to the transmission rate (especially at high rates). Each client
5ci of AP α will receive the same throughput Ti in the long term; this throughput is
given by:
Ti =Mα ·
B∑κ
i=1
B
fci
=Mα ·
1∑κ
i=1
1
fci
. (1)
In the above equation, Mα is the fraction of the time that AP α is able to access
the medium, given the contention with its co-channel neighbor devices. We assume
that AP α transmits data packets of the same length B to all clients. From the above
equation it is evident that if a client ci receives low throughput, all clients will also
receive equally low throughput under saturated conditions. Note that this phenomenon
has been taken into account during the design of previous performance improvement
algorithms for WLANs; examples can be found in [3], [8], [9], [10]. All these studies
take the anomaly as a given and try to improve the network performance through
other intelligent strategies, such as AP load balancing and power control. In other
words, such studies are inherently based on the fact that the 802.11 MAC protocol
provides long-term fairness. Clearly, when this property of 802.11 is exploited by a
malicious attacker, the performance of the schemes that are based on this property
is also compromised. Hence, the existence of a mechanism that detects and mitigates
such jammers becomes very vital.
2.1.1 Studies on mitigating the performance anomaly in 802.11
There have been numerous efforts on addressing the anomaly in 802.11. However, most
of them either require significant modifications on the 802.11 protocol functionality or
they are very difficult to implement in practice.
Packet aggregation: Razafindralambo et al., [11] propose PAS, a technique that
involves packet aggregation with dynamic time intervals. With PAS, nodes transmit
consecutive packets back-to-back, separated by a SIFS period [12]. As a result, high-
rate clients are able to transmit/receive many packets during an allocated time interval.
However, packet aggregation requires modifications on the 802.11 protocol, in order to
allow back-to-back data frame transmissions.
Contention window manipulation: Kim et al., [13] show that the anomaly can
be addressed by tuning the 802.11 contention window size. They compute the mini-
mum value of the window for the elimination of the anomaly. This technique, however,
requires modification to the algorithm that selects the value of the contention window
in 802.11. In contrast, our proposed scheme (described in the following section) does
not require any changes to the 802.11 protocol semantics.
Data traffic manipulation: Bellavista et al., in [14] proposeMUM, an application-
level middleware for facilitating multimedia streaming services. MUM tries to detect
the anomaly by monitoring the RSSI of received packets and estimating the goodness of
links. It employs the Linux tc/iptables to implement a hierarchical token buffer sched-
uler [15] that “differentiates” data transmissions towards low-rate nodes. The RSSI,
however, cannot accurately capture the levels of contention and interference [16]. In
addition, [14] uses a limited set of 4 static rate classes for traffic differentiation; this
setting is not adequate in jamming scenarios, as we show in section 4. Along the same
lines, Dunn et al., [17] propose a heuristic for allocating a packet size to every client,
which is proportional to the transmission rate.We show in section 4 that the use of this
heuristic during an implicit-jamming attack leads to some undesirable effects that in
6turn lead to poorer throughput than what is possible with FIJI. Similar approaches are
followed in [18,19] and [20]. Furthermore, Yang et al. [21] analytically model a WLAN
with stations that support multiple transmission rates in order to demonstrate the per-
formance anomaly. In contrast with these studies, our anti-jamming solution addresses
the fact that the maximum transmission rate achieved by a single client can bound the
total AP throughput. Tan and Guttag [22] propose TBR, a practical scheme that can
operate in conjunction with any MAC protocol to provide long-term time-based fair-
ness in WLANs. TBR schedules packet transmissions, taking into account the quality
of the links of the AP with its clients. The goal of this scheme is to provide an equal
amount of long-term channel occupancy time to each competing node. They show via
experimentation that this approach can prevent faster nodes from being dragged down
by slower ones. The authors provide a proof-of-concept implementation of TBR on an
802.11b small-scale testbed. However, allocating a significantly large amount of service
time (order of hundreds of milliseconds) to jammed clients will have a tremedous impact
to the achieved throughput of healthy clients. This is especially pronounced in cases
where healthy clients run interactive applications. In addition, although they discuss
the potential overheads of their implementation (due to the exchange of control mes-
sages between APs and clients), they do not quantify these overheads in 802.11a/g/n
networks, which support much higher transmission rates. Note also that the main idea
behind TBR resembles the operation of DRT (explained later in section 3), since the
jammed client will be allocated a particular time period for being served, which may
not be sufficient to sustain the maximum possible throughput that this client can
achieve under jamming. We discuss TBR further in section 4. Guo et al. [23] utilize
the idle communication power of wireless interfaces during TCP sessions, to improve
the throughput and energy efficiency of stations in multi-rate WLANs. The idea here
is that links that support transmission rates no only suffer low throughputs, but also
(a) significantly degrade the performance of other nodes, and (b) have to stay awake to
generate timely TCP acknowledgements, and this is energy inefficient. Given this, the
authors propose a data forwarding mechanism and an energy-aware channel allocation
mechanism. However, they do not consider UDP traffic, which is typically more ag-
gressive and with which nodes need to stay awake for longer time periods. In addition,
they also do not consider the presence of malicious adversaries. Finally, Bahl et al. [24]
propose SoftRepeater, a practical system with which, clients cooperatively mitigate the
802.11 performance anomaly. SoftRepeater allows a set of clients that maintain good
links qualities with their AP, to act as repeaters for the poor-link clients (which are
typically located further away from the AP), in order to improve the overall network
performance. However, SoftRepeater is unable to mitigate the effects of the implicit
jamming attack. This is because SoftRepeater assumes that the cause of poor perfor-
mance is the low SINR levels due to either distance from the AP or increased legitimate
interference. In fact, this is how the implicit jamming attack can intelligently mislead
legitimate nodes with regards to the reception SINR. Note that an implicit jammer can
attack clients with quite high link qualities, as long as it uses a very low transmission
power in way that no other devices are explicitly jammed, as we discuss in section 4.
Therefore, even if packets are replayed by helper clients (as per SoftRepeater), those
replayed packets will also suffer very frequent collisions due to the attack.
From the above discussion, as well as our measurements in section 4, it becomes
evident that prior efforts on overcoming the performance anomaly problem in 802.11
cannot efficiently mitigate implicit jammers. We approach the 802.11 anomaly from
the security point of view; in particular we examine a case where a malicious adversary
7can remotely exploit this feature as a vulnerability to cause complete starvation to the
associated clients. FIJI is effective against the implicit jamming attack, provides the
best trade-offs between throughput and fairness and does not require any modifications
on the 802.11 protocol.
2.2 Jamming in Wireless Networks
Jammers are classified into two main categories based on their behavior.
Constant jammers emit electromagnetic energy all the time. This category in-
cludes deceptive jammers [25], which transmit seemingly legitimate back-to-back data
packets. With this, deceptive jammers can mislead other nodes and monitoring sys-
tems into believing that legitimate traffic is being sent over the medium. Due to this,
deceptive jammers are more difficult to detect. This jamming technique is not usually
adopted, since it depletes the battery of mobile jammers rather quickly. Indeed, con-
tinuously emitting signals limits the ability of jammers to be autonomous and thereby
their moving flexibility, since they will highly likely have to depend on external power
sources.
Intermittent jammers conserve battery life by emitting energy intermittently.
As examples: (i) Random jammers alternate between random jamming and sleeping
periods. (ii) Reactive jammers emit energy right after the detection of traffic on the
medium, and remain inactive as long as the medium is idle. The implementation of
reactive jammers is difficult; however, the detection and alleviation of reactive-jamming
attacks is very challenging. More details on the different jamming models can be found
in [25].
A large body or prior studies employ frequency hopping (FH) techniques to over-
come the presence of jammers [26–28]. Frequency hopping can be either proactive or
reactive. With proactive FH, nodes periodically hop between frequencies, in order to
avoid being interfered with potentially malicious jammers in their neighborhood. With
reactive FH, nodes that suspect the existence of a jammer in their vicinity, switch to
a new frequency and re-establish their sessions on the new frequency after appropriate
handshaking. We do not employ any frequency hopping related operations in FIJI for
the following reasons. First, FH cannot alleviate the influence of a wide-band jammer
[29] [30], which can effectively jam all the available channels. Second, FH is ineffective
in scenarios with multiple narrow-band jammers residing on every available channel.
Given that there are few orthogonal channels with 802.11 (12 channels with 802.11a
and just three with 802.11g), frequency hopping by itself is unlikely to be very effective.
In addition, recent studies have shown that a few cleverly coordinated, narrow-band
jammers can practically block the entire spectrum [31]. Third, most previously pro-
posed FH schemes assume that the hopping between channels is fast. However this is
not always the case in real systems. Specifically, FH might require a significant amount
of time based on the hardware used. Prior work [32] has reported that switching be-
tween frequencies and restoring the data session may take up to 1000 msec. During
the switching period there is no traffic flowing from/to the node, and this decreases
the long-term throughput. However, even if such delays can be minimized with driver
modifications [33], multiple jammers residing on different channels as well as wideband
jammers can easily render FH inadequate. Therefore, FIJI does not rely on frequency
hopping, although it could be used in conjunction.
82.2.1 Previously proposed anti-jamming techniques
Prior work has focused on the impact of jamming on the performance of isolated
wireless links. To the best of our knowledge, FIJI is the first system to examine the
effects of implicit jamming on the overall performance of WLANs and mesh networks.
Gummadi et al. [26] find that 802.11 devices are vulnerable to specific patterns of
narrow-band interference related to time recovery, dynamic range selection and PLCP-
header processing. They show that due to these limitations, an intelligent jammer with
a 1000 times weaker signal (than that of the legitimate transceiver) can still corrupt the
reception of packets. In order to alleviate these effects, they propose a rapid frequency
hopping strategy. Navda et al. [27] implement a proactive frequency hopping protocol
with pseudo-random channel switching. They compute the optimal frequency hopping
parameters, assuming that the jammer is aware of the frequency hopping procedure
that is followed. Xu et al. [28] propose two anti jamming techniques: reactive channel
surfing and spatial retreats. However, they do not consider 802.11 networks. In [25],
efficient mechanisms for jammer detection at the PHY layer are developed. However,
the authors do not propose any anti-jamming mechanisms. The work in [34] suggests
that the proper adjustment of transmission power and error correction codes could
alleviate jamming effects. However, it neither proposes an anti-jamming protocol nor
performs evaluations of these strategies. Along the same lines, Lin and Noubir [35]
present an analytical evaluation of the use of cryptographic interleavers with various
coding schemes to improve the robustness of wireless LANs. In subsequent work, Noubir
and Lin [36] investigate the power efficiency of a jammer. They show that in the absence
of error-correction codes a jammer can conserve battery power by simply destroying
only a portion of a legitimate packet. Xu, Trappe and Zhang [37] exploit the ability of
a receiver to identify that an arrived packet is corrupted in the presence of jamming.
They propose an anti-jamming technique with which, data is encoded based on the
inter-arrival times between receptions of corrupted packets. They show that this results
in a low-rate channel under jamming. Finally, Noubir [38] proposes a combination of
directional antennae and node-mobility in order to alleviate jammers. The idea here
is to achieve a high antenna gain from the transmitter to the receiver and vice versa;
with this, the relative ratio of the jamming power to the signal power will be reduced.
The same effect can be also achieved by using sectored antennas, or any other type of
smart antennas that concentrate the energy of the beam towards a specific direction.
Various other jamming analysis, detection and mitigation schemes have been pro-
posed in the literature [39–46]. However, none of these efforts consider the implicit
jamming attack; FIJI is the first system to address this attack.
3 FIJI to Combat the Implicit Jamming Attack
In this section, we describe the design of our anti-jamming software system, FIJI. The
high -level goal of FIJI is to detect the attack and restore the throughput on clients that
are not explicitly jammed (“healthy” clients) as well as to maintain connectivity and
provide the highest possible throughput to explicitly “jammed” clients. FIJI involves
the co-design of two individual modules, executed at the AP: a detection module and
a traffic shaping module. We have implemented the two modules in the kernel space
(we provide implementation details in section 4).
93.1 Attack model
In this work, we focus on low-power deceptive jammers. In particular, we assume that
the jamming device has the following properties:
– It is placed next to legitimate clients. With this, the jammer is able to distort
packets destined to the jammed client(s). In addition, the jammer is constantly
transmitting packets back-to-back, thereby prohibiting the jammed clients from
accessing the medium.
– It operates at very low power. As discussed earlier, the jammer simply needs to
explicitly affect one of the clients of the AP. By transmitting at low power the
jammer can conserve energy and make the detection of the attack a challenging
task.
– It is able to operate on a wide band (covering all the available channels); this makes
frequency hopping techniques inappropriate.
We describe the operation of the detection and the traffic shaping modules in what
follows.
3.2 Detecting the implicit-jamming attack
The purpose of this module is to make the AP capable of detecting the jammed clients.
Previous jamming detection schemes assume that the jammed node is always the one
that performs the detection. However with the implicit-jamming attack, the AP needs
to detect the jammed client(s) in order to prevent the throughput starvation of the
healthy clients. As an example, in [25] the jammed node performs a consistency check
between the instantaneous PDR (Packet Delivery Ratio), and the RSSI (Received
Signal Strength Indicator) that it measures on its antenna. If the PDR is extremely
low (i.e., almost zero), while the RSSI is much higher than the CCA threshold1, the
node is considered to be jammed. With the implicit jamming attack, however, the AP
does not know the RSSI value that is observed by each of its clients. Thus, the approach
in [25] does not allow the AP to detect the implicit jamming attack.
Measuring the transmission delay per client: FIJI relies on measuring the
data unit transmission delay dci = B/fci of every client ci at the AP. More specifically,
the denominator of Eq. (1) is the aggregate transmission delay Dα incurred by AP α
in order to serve all of its associated clients once; it is the sum of the individual dci
values, i ∈ {1, ..., κ}, of the κ clients that are associated with AP α [3]. In other
words, if we assume saturated downlink traffic, Dα corresponds to the average time
that AP α needs in order to send one data unit to every client. The value of Dα is
the same for all clients, and the transmission delay dci of client ci contributes to the
value of Dα. Hence, a sudden, very large increment in Dα indicates that one or more
of the dci values has suddenly increased; this would imply that one or more clients are
under attack. Towards calculating Dα, AP α needs to measure the dci value for every
client ci (this includes possible retransmission delays and the rate-scaling overhead
2).
Measuring dci will directly reveal the jammed clients: the value of dcJ
i
for a jammed
1 The CCA (Clear Channel Assessment) threshold specifies the RSSI value below which,
receptions are ignored with regards to carrier sensing [10].
2 The rate scaling overhead accounts for the higher delays incurred due to transient lower
rates that the rate adaptation algorithm invokes.
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client cJi is likely to be much higher than the delays of the other clients. We adopt this
detection strategy in FIJI.
3.3 Shaping the traffic at the AP to alleviate jammers
A trivial solution to the problem of mitigating the attack would be for the AP to simply
stop serving the jammed clients. However, this would be unfair, since in many cases
the jammed clients might still be able to receive data, albeit at lower rates. We opt to
provide a fair bandwidth allocation solution; our twofold objective is to simultaneously
achieve the following:
– Objective 1: For each of the healthy clients we seek to provide the same through-
put that they would have enjoyed in the absence of the jammer, i.e., prior to the
attack.
– Objective 2: A jammed client typically cannot receive much throughput as long
as the jammer is active. Hence we want to provide to every jammed client the
maximum possible throughput that it can receive, given that objective 1 is satisfied.
We refer to the state where these objectives are met as the optimal state.
We propose a real-time, cross-layer software system to mitigate the effects of the
implicit-jamming attack. The system is implemented partly in the Click module [6]
and partly in the wireless driver/firmware. Click receives information from the MAC
Layer with regards to the properties of the jammed clients. The AP→client traffic is
then appropriately shaped and forwarded down to the MAC layer at the AP.
3.3.1 DPT: Controlling the data packet size
With this strategy, the AP fragments the packets destined to jammed clients; each
such smaller fragment is now an independent packet. We call this approach DPT for
Data Packet Tuning. With DPT, the rate at which these smaller packets are sent to
the MAC layer is equal to the rate at which normal packets were forwarded to the
MAC layer, prior to jamming. DPT is expected to have the following effects: (a) The
transmission of small data packets is more robust to interference due to jamming; hence
these small packets are more likely to be correctly deciphered by the jammed clients.
(b) The rate at which the AP accesses the medium for the jammed clients remains
unchanged; however, the channel occupancy time that is spent for them is reduced,
due to transmitting smaller packets to jammed clients. Hence, the AP will allocate a
larger fraction of time for healthy clients. We reiterate that by maintaining the same
rate of packet forwarding down to the MAC layer at the AP, we implicitly reduce the
long-term data rate towards the jammed clients.
Deriving the optimal data packet sizes: Our target is to determine the right
packet size such that the optimal state is reached. The problem of achieving this state
is formulated as follows.
Let us suppose that AP α has κ associated clients, and that n clients are being
jammed, with n ≤ κ. Our objective is to minimize the aggregate transmission delay
DJα of all the jammed clients c
J
i , i ∈ {1, .., n} of AP α. In other words, we seek to
minimize
DJα =
n∑
i=1
dcJ
i
=
n∑
i=1
Ji
fcJ
i
,
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where Ji is the data unit length for jammed client c
J
i , while fcJ
i
is the deliverable rate
at cJi .
Constraint: The dcJ
i
value of each jammed client cJi must be at least equal (and as
close as possible) to its data unit transmission delay dci in benign conditions:
X1 : dJci ≥ dci ⇒
Ji
fcJ
i
≥
B
fci
, ∀i ∈ n ,
where B is the default data unit length that the AP is using for all clients, and fci is
the deliverable rate to cJi in benign conditions. As explained earlier, the value of Dα
is the same for all clients that are associated with AP α. If we sum constraint X1 over
all jammed clients, the left hand side of the inequality is our objective function. With
this we make sure that the healthy κ − n clients will indeed experience an aggregate
transmission delay very close to Dα =
∑κ
i=1(B/fci); note that this is the aggregate
transmission delay that was experienced by these clients prior to the jamming attack.
Hence, by choosing the packet size Ji that results in a transmission delay that is as
close to dci as possible, we ensure that the throughput of the healthy clients remains
unaffected (we elaborate on this later with an example).
Based on the above constraint, our optimization problem can be formulated as
follows:
minimize : DJα =
n∑
i=1
dcJ
i
=
n∑
i=1
Ji
fcJ
i
(2)
subject to : 1 ≤ Ji ≤ B, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, (3)
and X1. (4)
The solution to the above problem provides the values of Ji that minimize (2). Although
the problem is an integer programming problem, its special form ensures that it always
has a solution, which can be found in polynomial time w.r.t. the number of variables.
We show these properties in what follows.
Lemma 1 Our optimization problem always has a solution.
Proof Our objective function is linear. As such, it is convex and it has a minimum
in the closed and bounded set In, where I = [1, B] ⊆ <. Therefore, the function
exhibits a minimum on the points that we retrieve, if we sample set I to pick integers
in J = {1, 2, ..., B}. Hence, our objective function has a minimum on the set Jn, and on
each of its non-empty subsets. We now prove that if we take into account the constraint
X1, a feasible point still exists (i.e., the constraint set is not empty). In other words,
we show that there is a non-empty subset of Jn that satisfies the constraint X1. We
have fcJ
i
≤ fci , since the deliverable rate for the jammed client is expected to be at
most what it was in benign conditions. We now consider the following two cases for
the relation between fcJ
i
and fci .
– If fcJ
i
= fci , then
1
f
cJ
i
= 1fci
. If we select Ji = B ∀i, we conclude that constraint
X1 is satisfied.
– If fcJ
i
< fci , then
1
f
cJ
i
> 1
fci
(since both quantities are positive). Let us pick
Ji ≥ B ·
f
cJ
i
fci
. The right hand side of the inequality is smaller than B since
f
cJ
i
fci
< 1.
Thus, there exists such a Ji, and:
Ji
f
cJ
i
≥ Bfci
. Hence constraint X1 is satisfied.
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Consequently, our problem always has a solution.
Lemma 2 Our optimization problem can be solved in polynomial time w.r.t. the num-
ber of variables.
Proof The value of our objective function increases as we increase the value of each
variable Ji. As a result in order to minimize the objective function we need to keep
these Jis as small as possible. Constraint X1 defines the smallest possible real value
for each one of the variables. Since Ji can take only integer values we just need to
pick the smallest possible integer that satisfies constraint X1. This needs O(1) time for
every variable and given that we have n such variables our optimization problem can
be solved in linear time, O(n).
How does DPT operate? Let us consider a case study with AP α, κ = 3, n = 1
and default packet size B. The transmission delays for the healthy clients c1 and c2 are
d1 and d2, respectively; for the jammed client c3, it is d3. The long-term throughput
of every client in benign conditions will be:
Tb =
B
d1 + d2 + d3
.
If c3 is now being jammed, its transmission delay will be d
J
3 > d3 and the new through-
put will be:
TJ =
B
d1 + d2 + d
J
3
.
By applying DPT, the packet size towards c3 will be J
dpt
3 and its new transmission
delay will be ddpt3 . Since the rest of the clients are to maintain their old transmission
delays (they are not explicitly jammed), the throughput with DPT will be:
Tdpt =
B
d1 + d2 + d
dpt
3
.
Our minimization problem ensures that ddpt3 ≈ d3. Thus, for clients c1 and c2:
Tdpt
1
= Tdpt
2
≈ Tb.
In other words, DPT restores the throughput at the healthy clients.
Next, we show that the jammed client cannot receive a higher throughput if we
further decrease the packet size3 to a value J l3 < J
dpt
3 . With packet size J
dpt
3 the
throughput at c3 will be:
Tdpt
3
=
Jdpt3
d1 + d2 + d
dpt
3
.
Let us assume that with packet size J l3 < J
dpt
3 the transmission delay of c3 is d
l
3. The
throughput at c3 will then be
Tl3 =
J l3
d1 + d2 + d
l
3
.
3 For larger packet sizes, objective 1 cannot be satisfied; hence we do not need to consider
such a case.
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The required condition Tl3 < Tdpt3 can be simplified as:
Tl3 < Tdpt3 ⇔ d
l
3 >
J l3
Jdpt3
· (d1 + d2 + d
dpt
3 )− d1 − d2.
Since the packet delivery rate fc3 is the same, we have:
J l3
Jdpt3
=
dl3
ddpt3
⇔ dl3 = d
dpt
3 ·
J l3
Jdpt3
.
Thus:
J l3
Jdpt3
· ddpt3 >
J l3
Jdpt3
· (d1 + d2 + d
dpt
3 )− d1 − d2 ⇔ 0 > (
J l3
Jdpt3
− 1)(d1 + d2).
The last inequality is always true; hence, Tl3 < Tdpt3 .
Similar steps can be followed in order to show that DPT operates in the same
manner in scenarios with multiple jammed clients. We adopt DPT in FIJI.
3.3.2 DRT: An alternate approach
An alternative strategy would be to explicitly tune the rate at which the packets are de-
livered at the MAC layer (the packet size is now kept unchanged), destined to jammed
clients. Fewer packets would arrive at the MAC layer for transmission towards the
jammed clients, thereby allowing the AP to send traffic to healthy clients more fre-
quently. Let us call this approach DRT for Data Rate Tuning. DRT operates as follows.
Based on the measured dci for each client ci, the deliverable rate to every jammed client
would be:
fcJ
i
=
B
dcJ
i
. (5)
DRT would bound the packet generation rate such that the data rate to the jammed
client cJi is at most fcJ
i
. As a result, the rest of the (healthy) clients would share the
remaining bandwidth. Thus, they would enjoy a share that is in fact higher than what
they had prior to the attack. However, the packets destined to the jammed clients could
be potentially lost due to channel or interference effects. Hence with DRT, the jammed
clients will eventually receive lower long-term throughput than the specified (by DRT)
rate of fcJ
i
. Clearly, while both DPT and DRT shape the traffic in order to overcome the
implicit jamming effects, they essentially differ in the way they allocate the bandwidth.
With DPT the healthy clients receive the same throughput as before the attack, while
the jammed clients achieve the maximum possible throughput under the circumstances.
On the other hand, with DRT the healthy clients have a higher share of the bandwidth
than in benign settings and receive more throughput than before the attack; the APs will
spend more time serving the healthy clients, since most of the traffic is now destined to
them. However, since the jammed clients do not reach their capacity, they are treated
rather “unfairly”. We evaluate this fairness versus throughput trade-off in section 4.
4 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we first describe our implementation of FIJI. Next we apply FIJI on
two experimental testbeds and evaluate its efficacy in overcoming the implicit jamming
attack.
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4.1 The implementation of FIJI
FIJI is implemented entirely at the AP; no client software modifications are needed.
In addition, FIJI does not require any special functionalities at the APs or at the
clients; the only requirement is for the AP to be able to measure the dci value for each
affiliated client. Hence, FIJI can be easily applied on commercial APs through a minor
driver/firmware update. In order to implement the two modules of FIJI we perform
modifications on the driver and firmware of the AP, and we develop specific traffic
shaping functionalities on the Click framework [6].
Implementing the implicit-jamming detection module: As explained in sec-
tion 3.2, the AP needs to measure dci for every client ci. This will reveal, with high
probability, the set of jammed clients. However, the value of dci cannot be directly ob-
tained from the driver of the wireless card; modifications in the firmware are required
in order to compute this value. We use a prototype version of the Intel ipw2200 AP
driver/firmware; for every client we measure the time duration between the placement
of the packet at the head of the MAC queue until an 802.11 ACK frame is received
for this packet. The value is then passed up to the driver. The AP maintains a table
in the driver space with the dci value for every client ci. It also computes D
J
α (when
jammers are active) and Dα (when jammers are inactive), by summing up the corre-
sponding client delays. Temporary variations of the dci values are handled by FIJI by
using weighted moving average filtering; the previously maintained average is assigned
a weight of 0.9 while the new sample has an associated weight of 0.1 (similar values are
used in [3,8]). Using these values, the AP constructs a table with the appropriate data
packet sizes for the jammed clients. If the weighted dci(new)/dci(old) value (for one or
more clients) exceeds a pre-specified threshold δ, the AP computes the new packet sizes,
updates the table and subsequently feeds it into the traffic shaping module, described
below.
Implementation of the traffic shaping module: We implement the traffic
shaper in Click. The module receives the table from the driver with suggested pa-
rameter settings for every client and shapes the traffic accordingly. We implement
both DPT and DRT for comparison purposes. For DPT we have also developed an
application-level script, which reads the table with the suggested packet sizes and in-
puts these values to the rude/crude measurement tool [47]. For DRT one may use
two different Click elements, namely either the BandwidthShaper(bandwidth) or the
LinkUnqueue(latency, bandwidth) element; we utilize the latter. Finally, we config-
ure the AP to periodically flush the stored transmission delay values for every client
and perform fresh delay measurements, using the default packet size. With this, we ad-
dress scenarios of mobile jammers, which may move to the proximity of different clients,
jammers with variable transmission power as well as jammers that stop operating.
4.2 Experimental set-up and methodology
Description of the experimental networks:We use two different wireless testbeds
(we refer to them as testbed-A and testbed-B respectively) throughout the evaluation
of FIJI [7]. Testbed-A consists of 28 Soekris net4826 nodes [48], which mount a Debian
Linux distribution with kernel v2.6 over NFS. The testbed is deployed in the 3rd
floor, at the research labs wing of Engineering Building Unit II, at the University of
California, Riverside. The node layout is depicted in Fig. 3a. Each node is equipped
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with an Intel-2915 and aWistron Neweb CM9 mini PCI card, which carries the AR5213
as the main chip. Each card is connected to two 5-dBi gain external omnidirectional
antennae. We use both the main and aux antenna connectors of the card for diversity.
As mentioned earlier, we use a proprietary version of the ipw2200 AP driver/firmware
of the Intel-2915 card. With this version we are able to (a) measure the Dα and D
J
α
values at the AP, and (b) experiment with both 802.11a and 802.11g. We also use the
Madwifi-ng driver for the Atheros-based cards. We utilize testbed-A to evaluate FIJI
in WLAN scenarios with UDP traffic. Testbed-B consists of 11 nodes, it is deployed in
the same building at the faculty wing, and has the exact same hardware and software
configuration as testbed-A. However, the deployment area is quite different, since nodes
belonging to testbed-B have been deployed in small rooms, and there is no line of sight
between them. The deployment of testbed-B is shown in Fig. 3b.
The different properties of the two testbeds, in terms of deployment, enable us
examine the effectiveness of FIJI in diverse topologies. Meanwhile this ensures that the
observed relative performance (with each testbed) is not affected by the hardware and
the software capabilities of the individual devices.
Fig. 3 The deployment of our 802.11a/g testbeds in the 3rd floor of our campus building.
The clients are represented by dots, the APs by squares and the jammers by stars.
Constant jammer implementation: We have implemented our own deceptive
jammer (instead of purchasing a commercial one [2]) since this gives us the freedom
of tuning various jamming parameters. Our implementation of a constant jammer is
based on a specific card configuration and a user space utility that sends broadcast
packets as fast as possible. Our jammers are also equipped with the Intel-2915 cards;
our ipw2200 prototype firmware for these cards allows the tuning of the CCA threshold
parameter. By setting the CCA threshold to 0 dBm, we force the WiFi card to ignore
all 802.11 signals during carrier sensing (packets arrive at the jammer’s circuitry with
powers much less than 0 dBm, even if the distances between the jammer and the
legitimate transceivers are very small). The jammer transmits broadcast UDP traffic.
This ensures that its packets are transmitted back-to-back and that the jammer does
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not wait for any ACK messages (the back-off functionality is disabled in 802.11 for
broadcast traffic). We have developed an application-layer utility that employs raw
sockets, allowing the construction of UDP packets and the forwarding of each packet
directly down to the hardware.
Experimental methodology: For each experiment we first enable traffic from
the AP to its clients and subsequently we activate the jammer(s). The duration of
each experiment is 10 minutes; during each minute, the jammer is inactive for the first
k sec, where k ∈ [5, 20], and active for the other 60 − k sec. We use a subset of 6
nodes as the jamming devices (nodes 15, 31, 35, 36, 45 and 58 in Fig. 3). We collect
throughput and transmission delay (dci) measurements once every 500 msec, for each
client. We experiment with many different topological settings, with different numbers
of APs and clients. By default all legitimate nodes set their transmission powers to the
maximum value of 20 dBm and their CCA thresholds to -80 dBm. We examine both
802.11a and 802.11g links (unless otherwise stated, we observe the same behavior for
802.11a and 802.11g). The experiments are performed late at night in order to avoid
interference from collocated WLANs, as well as not to cause interference to them. We
use saturated UDP traffic with a default data packet size B = 1500 bytes. We also
experiment with TCP traffic. We use the iperf measurement tool to generate data
traffic among legitimate nodes. We also use the rude tool to test DPT.
In what follows, we apply our anti-jamming framework on our testbeds and evaluate
its efficiency in alleviating the effects of implicit-jamming on the network performance.
We first discuss our experiments on testbed-A, where we consider WLAN settings and
UDP traffic. Subsequently we discuss our experiments on testbed-B, where we evaluate
FIJI on a mesh topology with both UDP and TCP traffic.
4.3 Assessing the efficacy of FIJI in WLAN settings
Next we evaluate FIJI in WLAN deployments, where packets travel at most 1 hop (i.e.,
from the APs to their clients).
4.3.1 The efficacy of the detection module
We seek to observe two properties of this module:
1. Efficiency of Detection: How quickly can FIJI detect the presence of implicit jam-
mers?
2. Accuracy of Detection: How accurately can FIJI determine if there is an ongoing
jamming attack?
We conduct experiments with 5 APs and different numbers of clients with various link
qualities. We configure the jammers to transmit at 0 dBm (1 mW) with CCA = 0
dBm, such that they affect one or more clients without affecting the APs.
a) On the speed of detection: Our measurements indicate that the transmission
delay dcJ
i
of a client increases sharply upon experiencing the implicit jamming attack.
This increase is seen in less than 700 msecs; this time includes the transient periods
before the weighted average dcJ
i
converges to a stable value. Fig. 4 depicts a delay
snapshot with one AP and four clients with moderate-quality links. We observe that
the dcJ
1
value increases significantly (by 26 times in this experiment). Other experiments
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Fig. 4 FIJI detects jammed clients by mea-
suring their data unit transmission delays.
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Fig. 5 The jammer detection functional-
ity of FIJI is accurate in most cases.
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Fig. 7 DPT restores the performance of
healthy clients to that in benign settings.
provided similar results. In summary, these results show that FIJI can quickly detect
implicit jamming attacks.
b) On the accuracy of detection: We seek to evaluate FIJI in terms of its ability
to detect an implicit jamming attack in the presence of interference. Note that the
dci value for a client ci is affected by the levels of interference on the AP → ci link.
The higher the level of interference, the higher the dci value. In order to evaluate this
ability of FIJI, we perform experiments with multiple overlapping cells (each with its
own AP), so that some clients suffer interference from one or more APs; in this setting,
we activate our low-power jammers.
Detecting jamming on good quality links: We first consider links that have a
high SINR. Fig. 5 depicts sample experimental results. In the snapshot of Fig. 5, a
jammer is placed such that it affects 2 out of the 4 clients of an AP. We observe that
FIJI is able to perform a successful detection. In general, our empirical observations
suggest that when threshold δ ≥ 9, FIJI can effectively detect the attack (Fig. 5). In
the experiment described above, the value of δ was 9.
FIJI and poor quality links: With poor quality links (SINR is low), FIJI cannot
easily decide if a client is under attack or not. This effect is captured in Fig. 6, where
the jammer affects a very poor link. In particular, the link 46→25 is considered with
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the node 45 acting as a jammer (Fig. 3). The link achieves 190 Kbits/sec in the absence
of jamming and 164 Kbits/sec under jamming. Since the jammer does not significantly
increase the delay experienced on such poor links, FIJI cannot decipher whether the
increased dnode−25 value is due to jamming or legitimate interference. However, in such
conditions, the overall change in the network performance due to the jammer is unlikely
to be significant; the presence of the poor link already hurts the network performance.
Furthermore note that a jammer is unlikely to attack such poor quality links if it aims
to harm the network to the extent possible.
In some extreme cases, a poor quality link (exposed perhaps to other interfering
APs that are hidden from its own AP) might cause a client to experience large delays.
In such scenarios with healthy but poor-quality links, FIJI may incorrectly classify such
links as being jammed. Classifying such cases as attacks, though, is perhaps appealing
in terms of improving performance for the rest of the network.
FIJI and high power jammers: An implicit-jamming attacker is likely to place
its jammer(s) very close to one or more clients so as to:
– degrade the client’s observed SINR value to the extent possible, and
– use a very low transmission power, in order to conserve energy and avoid detection.
As our experiments indicate, under these conditions, FIJI can identify the jammed
clients in real time since all measured dcJ
i
values are usually extremely high for those
clients. In contrast, a jammer could use high transmission power (although this could
increase the chance of its detection and result in high energy consumption). Such a
high power jammer is likely to affect multiple clients and even the AP itself, directly.
The delays of all these clients may go up and in this case, given its design principles,
FIJI may not be able to detect the jammer. However, there are other jammer detection
techniques that can be used in conjunction with FIJI to detect such jammers [25].
4.3.2 The traffic shaping module in action
Next we evaluate the efficacy of DPT and compare it against DRT.
DPT is the most fair solution: In a nutshell we observe that as long as the
jammer is successfully detected, DPT restores the throughput at the healthy clients.
A sample case is depicted in Fig. 7. Here, AP 44 transmits unicast traffic to clients
11, 13 and 19; node 36 is jamming client 11. In the absence of jamming each client
receives 4.8 Mbits/sec on average. When the jammer is active, without enabling DPT,
all clients receive 1.1 Mbits/sec on average. The solution to the problem formulated in
(2) suggests that J11 should be set to 345 bytes. When DPT is enabled and this packet
size is chosen for the jammed client, we observe that the throughput of the healthy
clients 13 and 19 is restored to 4.66 Mbits/sec, while the jammed client 11 achieves
about 1.1 Mbits/sec. Note that the healthy clients do not achieve their jamming-
free throughput of 4.8 Mbits/sec. This is because in our solution the equality in the
constraint X1 is achieved for a non-integral value of J11; we round the value of J11
up to the nearest integer. With this, the transmission delay for the jammed client is a
bit higher as compared to the delay under benign conditions and this slightly degrades
the throughput at the healthy clients.
In order to validate that DPT provides the most fair bandwidth allocation, we
experiment with many different J11 values. Fig. 8 depicts the results that correspond
to the settings with two J11 values: 166 and 700 bytes. We observe that:
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Fig. 9 DPT can easily handle scenarios
with multiple clients that are simultane-
ously jammed.
– With packet sizes smaller than Jdpt11 (case with 166 bytes), the jammed client does
not reach its capacity (receives 360 Kbits/sec) and the AP spends more time serving
the healthy clients (as discussed in section 3): each healthy client now receives 5.1
Mbits/sec. Note that the value J11 = 166 bytes is computed using the approach
proposed in [17] for the considered scenario and it clearly does not provide the
desirable fairness in terms of throughput. Hence, while with [17] healthy clients
potentially receive higher throughputs than in benign settings, jammed clients are
not given the opportunity to obtain the maximum possible throughput under the
circumstances.
– When the packet size is higher than Jdpt11 (case with 700 bytes), the throughput at
the jammed client is lower than 1.1 Mbits/sec; the healthy clients also underper-
form. This is again conformant with our analytical assessments in section 3 with
regards to the maximum achievable throughput.
We would like to point out here that “desirable fairness” refers to the fairness con-
ditions described in section 3; this is where healthy clients receive as much throughput
as before the jamming attack (or in the absence of implicit jammers), while jammed
clients receive as much throughput as possible (although not as much as healthy clients,
since they are within the direct range of the jammer). We consider this to be fair, since
the jammer does not explicitly affect healthy clients; the throughput of such clients
should not be affected by the existence of a jammer which does not directly reach
them. We do not argue that the fairness strategy of FIJI is better than other potential
fairness strategies (such as the one in [17]); instead we call for for deployments that
consider our fairness strategy. FIJI addresses our performance objectives in a satisfac-
tory manner. Clearly, if different performance objectives are considered, solutions such
as [17] and [14] may fit better than FIJI.
As an example, if the objective is to achieve a proportional fairness based rate
allocation (which is not inherently the case with the 802.11 protocol), allocating rates
to links that can infact support them seems to be a more natural choice. As another
example, a different criterion could consider that it is fair to allocate the same amount
of time for data transmissions to all clients (e.g. see TBR [22]). While such an objective
would potentially make sense in a benign setting, it is our belief that it is inappropriate
in the considered setting. This is because with such a method, a jammed client would
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be allocated the same amount of time for data transmissions as a healthy client. We
identify three possible outcomes with this approach:
1. The jammed client is allocated a significant amount of time: In this case, a healthy
client needs to wait for a considerable amount of time until the jammed client
finishes with its transmissions. This would result in very low long-term throughput
for healthy clients.
2. The jammed client is allocated an extremely small amount of time: In such a case,
the jammed client would potentially not be able to receive the maximum possi-
ble throughput in the allocated time, while a healthy client could receive higher
throughput than in benign settings.
3. The jammed client is allocated exactly the time required to achieve maximum through-
put: With this, the same outcome as with FIJI could be potentially achieved. How-
ever, given that TBR fixes the transmission time, it cannot accommodate scenarios
with mobile jammers, or generally with variable channel qualities over time.
Design and analysis of solutions that consider different performance objectives (like
the one described in section 3) are beyond the scope of this paper.
Multiple jammed clients: We have so far considered scenarios wherein a single
client was jammed. Next, we examine scenarios with multiple jammed clients per AP.
Our experiments reveal that DPT is also able to effectively mitigate the implicit jam-
ming attack in such scenarios. Fig. 9 presents a sample case with AP 46 and clients 11,
37 and 14; the jammer-node 36 explicitly affects both clients 11 and 37. Under benign
conditions all clients receive approximately 4.5 Mbits/sec on average. As soon as the
jammer is activated, without enabling DPT, all clients receive about 1.1 Mbits/sec.
DPT sets the value of J11 to be 367 bytes and J37 to be 1266 bytes. With this, DPT
is able to restore the throughput at the healthy clients.
DPT vs. DRT: Using the same methodology, we examine the effectiveness of
the DRT solution. Our measurements demonstrate that DRT provides much higher
throughput to healthy clients. On the other hand, DRT results in an additional unfair
degradation at the jammed client. Fig. 10 represents the behaviors in an example
scenario, with the same topological configuration as before (AP 44, clients 11, 13 and
19, jammer 36); the figure depicts the throughput prior to the attack (benign settings),
with the jammer without DRT, and after the application of DRT. We observe that DRT
overcomes the implicit impacts of the attack. Upon enabling DRT, clients 13 and 19
are no longer affected by the jammer and they receive 5.12 Mbits/sec each. Although
DRT sets the maximum allowable data rate towards client 11 to be 1.1 Mbits/sec, the
observed throughput at this client is significantly lower i.e., 680 Kbits/sec on average.
This behavior of DRT conforms with our discussion in section 3.3; we observe similar
trends in all our measurements with one or more jammed clients. To summarize, with
DRT the healthy clients receive more throughput than before the attack; however the
jammed clients are penalized further.
The choice between DPT and DRT depends on the performance objectives; one has
to decide between fairness (with DPT) and bandwidth utilization (with DRT). DPT
is fair: the healthy clients receive the same throughput as before the attack, while the
jammed clients achieve the maximum possible throughput under the circumstances. On
the other hand, DRT increases the throughput at the healthy clients and potentially, the
total network throughput. However, the jammed clients cannot receive the maximum
throughput that they can achieve in the presence of the jammer.
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Fig. 10 With DRT healthy clients receive
more throughput than before the attack.
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Fig. 11 DRT satisfies our objectives better
than other data rate allocation approaches.
Note that DRT also relies on the online measurement and use of dci . With this,
DRT seeks to eliminate the effects of implicit jamming at healthy clients, while at the
same time not degrade the throughput at jammed clients. Fig. 11 depicts a case with
802.11a where DRT sets the data rate at 1.1 Mbits/sec, while MUM [14] (recall our
discussion in section 2) sets 6 Mbits/sec. We observe that by using data rates higher
than the one chosen by DRT, the healthy clients are still affected by the attack, since
in this case the downlink traffic for the jammed client is still saturated. Moreover, if
we use lower data rates than the one chosen by DRT, the healthy clients get more
service time, however the jammed clients receive much lower throughput than with
DRT. More specifically, as discussed in section 2, MUM uses a limited set of static
rate classes for traffic differentiation; e.g. 4 rate classes in the case of 802.11b: 1, 2,
5.5 and 11 Mbits/sec, with decreasing priorities from higher to lower rates. Clearly for
802.11a/g the set of rate classes could be increased (e.g. to 8), but again it would still be
a limited set of fixed rates. Moreover, even if this rate set is further sub-divided down
to more sub-sets, as per the hierarchical token buffer (HTB) concept, an extended,
yet fixed rate set would be formed. This suggests that MUM could potentially be an
efficient countermeasure against implicit jamming only in cases where jammed clients
are assigned a data rate which ”luckily” happens to be the exact maximum rate that
the jammed client is able to receive. Stated otherwise, it is very difficult for MUM to
accommodate a scenario where the jammed client would receive the maximum possible
throughput, since this would require that MUM configures its HTB in such a way
that the capacity of a specific buffer in the hierarchy is exactly equal to the maximum
throughput that the jammed client can potentially receive. Even if such a buffer exists,
the HTB configuration cannot guarrantee that healthy clients would receive throughput
in a fair manner (as per our fairness criterion discussed in section 3). Allocating the
jammed client’s link with the AP to a buffer of higher capacity would compromise the
fairness in throughput for healthy clients. Analogously, allocating the jammed client
to a buffer with a capacity which is lower than the maximum possible throughput
under jamming, clearly violates our objective of allowing the jammed client to receive
the maximum possible throughput under the circumstances. Note that an HTB based
approach such as MUM could potentially result in a per-link data rate allocation that
offers the maximum total AP (or network) throughput. However, such a rate allocation
does not necessarily result in a fair throughput allocation for healthy clients, nor in
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the maximum possible throughput for the jammed clients. In other words, while MUM
could potentially offer a total AP throughput that is higher than that with DRT, it
cannot always satisfy the objective postulated in section 3.
4.4 Evaluating FIJI in wireless mesh settings with TCP traffic
Previous studies have shown that the 802.11 performance anomaly exists in scenarios
with TCP traffic as well [4]. In our last set of experiments, we assess the efficiency of
FIJI in mesh settings with TCP traffic. Throughout these measurements4 we select
topologies wherein all legitimate links are of similar quality in terms of packet delivery
ratio. With this, we are able to observe the efficacy of FIJI while ensuring that the
decisions of TCP for every flow in benign conditions are similar and are not affected
by legitimate interference.
As a representative example, we consider the following topology:
– Clients 17, 18 and 53 are affiliated with AP 21; clients 33, 34 and 51 are affiliated
with AP 32 (see Fig. 3).
– Jammers 35 and 58 are placed close to clients 34 and 51 respectively; the jammers
set their transmission powers to 0 dBm, such that they explicitly affect only clients
34 and 51.
We enable the following TCP flows between end-clients: 17 33, 18 34 and 53 51.
Packets from the clients of AP 21 are routed through AP 47 to AP 32. The latter
delivers the packets to their final destinations. The application data packet generation
rate is such that the source nodes always have packets to transmit.
Traffic shaping with TCP projects the same behavior as DRT: Our mea-
surements with TCP traffic suggest that the data rate decisions made by TCP provide a
high throughput at healthy clients, while jammed clients suffer extremely low through-
puts. This is due to the fact that the jammer causes frequent collisions at jammed
clients and thus, TCP is coerced to drastically decrease the contention windows at the
corresponding packet senders. As a result: (a) Fewer packets that are destined towards
jammed clients travel through the mesh route. (b) APs deliver packets towards healthy
clients for most of the time. This is depicted in Fig. 12. We observe that the through-
put at node 51 (the jammed client) is practically nullified, while healthy clients (node
33 and 34) receive a much higher throughput than before the attack. The achieved
performance is similar to the one achieved with DRT (recall our earlier discussion).
This is somewhat expected, since both TCP and DRT react by reducing the data rate
at source nodes. The same behavior is observed for the case of two active jammers
(Fig. 13). These experiments show that the application of TCP cannot provide a fair
throughput allocation under the presence of the implicit jamming attack.
FIJI provides a fair restoration of throughput: As with UDP traffic, the ap-
plication of FIJI restores the benign throughput at healthy clients. Moreover, jammed
clients achieve much higher throughputs than in the absence of FIJI (improvements
range between 170% and 300% throughout our experiments).
4 We consider TCP-Reno in this set of experiments.
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Fig. 12 FIJI provides a fair throughput
allocation in mesh deployments with TCP
traffic.
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Fig. 13 FIJI allocates the throughput
fairly in scenarios with TCP traffic and
with multiple jammed clients.
5 Further Discussion
FIJI and previous studies on traffic shaping: Our work is the first to analyti-
cally derive the optimal settings for traffic shaping at the AP to mitigate the implicit-
jamming attack. Traffic shapers have also been previously proposed in [14,18,19,17].
Clearly, FIJI could also be considered as another traffic shaper, simply to overcome
the performance degradation due to the 802.11 anomaly. Unlike FIJI however, previous
traffic shaping schemes cannot overcome the effects of an implicit-jamming attack, as
explained in sections 2 and 4. Other schemes that provide fair access to the WLAN
resources [49,3] would also be inadequate in combating an implicit-jamming attack
since they are not designed for this purpose.
On the assumption of equal packet size in benign conditions: The scope
of our work lies within the existence of the performance anomaly problem in 802.11
WLANs: under conditions with fully saturated traffic, the AP throughput is dependent
on the client with the worst AP-client link quality. The performance anomaly problem
is more prominent in scenarios where the AP sends packets of equal size to each as-
sociated client. Such traffic conditions are especially motivating for the application of
the implicit jamming attack, since it is sufficient to simply jam a single client in order
to significantly worsen the cell throughput performance. Clearly, if the attacked client
sends/receives small packets, or if the corresponding link between AP and jammed
client does not facilitate saturated traffic, then (a) the performance anomaly is not so
prominent, and (b) the jammer has simply selected the “wrong target”. We would also
like to point out that FIJI is especially applicable in scenarios where all clients run the
same, traffic-demanding application, such as video streaming, where the application
provides packets of very large size to the lower layers, which are further fragmented
by the transport layer and the MAC layer. Such fragments correspond to packets of
size B, as discussed in our paper. Finally we would like to point out that the assump-
tion of equal packet sizes in benign conditions helps rendering the problem analycally
tractable and easier to understand; such assumption has been extensively used in a
plurality of prior studies (such as [8], [9], etc) for the sake of analytical tractability.
FIJI versus power control: Power control has been suggested as a means of
mitigating legitimate interference [9,50]. Typically with power control, nodes tune their
transmission power and CCA settings in order to reduce the amount of interference
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from/to their neighbors. However, if the jammer is very close to one or more clients,
its signal cannot be ignored through CCA adaptation. If a client increases its CCA
threshold to a high level (to ignore the jammer’s signal), the connectivity to the AP
will be lost.
Addressing random and reactive jammers: FIJI can mitigate the interference
due to any type of jammer, even random or reactive jammers. With prolonged random
jamming and sleeping periods (order of seconds), FIJI can perform a rapid detection
and then customize the data packet size, as per the observed data unit transmission
delay dcJ
i
. If the sleep and active periods of the random jammer are of the order
of milliseconds, FIJI can monitor the average dcJ
i
value instead. FIJI is expected to
alleviate reactive jammers, too, since it only needs to monitor the impact of reactive
jamming by measuring dcJ
i
. We have not experimented with reactive jammers, since
implementing such a jammer is a very difficult task.
FIJI against other attacks: The two modules of FIJI can arguably be effective
against any attempt to exploit the 802.11 performance anomaly in order to degrade
the client throughput. As examples, a compromised device x could deliberately decide
to (a) associate to a very distant AP α, or (b) accept traffic at a very low reception
rate only (e.g. by discarding a large volume of correctly received packets). In both
cases, x would receive a few Kbits/sec. Note here that, legitimate, non-compromised
devices would follow such an approach only if they cannot associate with a better APs.
However, given that (a) dense deployments of WLANs make the presence of an AP with
a good quality link likely [9], and (b) distant poor quality APs are likely to be beyond
the administrative domain of the client (the client will not be able to associate with
such APs), the possibility of this is small in practice. FIJI can arguably be effective
against such attacks. In particular, FIJI considers such clients to be jammed clients
and ensures that the other clients remain unaffected.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we identify a low-power jamming attack that we call the implicit jamming
attack. With this attack, a jammer exploits a performance trait of the IEEE 802.11
MAC protocol to cause starvation to not only an explicitly jammed client, but all the
clients associated with the same AP as that client. Since the 802.11 MAC provides
long term fairness (under saturation conditions) to the associated clients in terms of
equal throughput, the attacker can nullify the AP throughput by affecting only one or
at most a few clients.
We design, implement and evaluate FIJI, a cross layer software system for miti-
gating the implicit-jamming attack. FIJI is comprised of two modules, for detecting
such an attack and shaping the traffic appropriately in order to alleviate the jamming
effects. We evaluate FIJI on an 802.11a/g testbed, and under many different jamming
scenarios. We show that FIJI can quickly detect the attack and effectively restore the
throughput at the implicitly affected clients. FIJI also ensures that the jammed clients
get as much throughput as they can under the circumstances.
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